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China and Russia: Implications for European and  
Transatlantic Security Cooperation1 
Frank Umbach 
Introduction 
he terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused renewed attention on South and Central 
Asia, the Middle East, and in particular, the Persian Gulf. These regions (also defined as the 
“Greater Middle East” or the „Strategic 
Ellipse“) are of strategic importance to the sta-
bility of the world energy supply in the 21st Cen-
tury—and thus for the future of European and 
transatlantic security cooperation.  
The world's energy security question—which 
connects disparate issues such as economics, national security, and environmental policies (such as 
the 'Kyoto-Protocol' for the global climate)—will likely become one of the major global challenges 
of this century. Key global energy developments already confirm these assumptions:  
• In 2004, global oil demand grew at the fastest rate in over 25 years. 
• The primary world energy demand will increase annually by 1.7 percent from more than 11 
to over 15 billion tons of oil equivalent from 2000 to 2030.  
• The developing countries' share in world demand will increase from almost 30 percent to 
more than 40 percent in 2030 because 83 percent of the world's population live in non-
industrialized countries that will double their current energy consumption.  
• Almost all the increase in energy production will occur in non-OECD countries.  
• In 2030, and contrary to the over-optimistic projections of many proponents of renewable 
energies, fossil fuels will remain the primary sources of energy. They will meet more than 
90 percent of the increase in demand until 2030.  
• Although natural gas will grow fastest and renewables are becoming more and more impor-
tant, oil will remain the most significant energy source—projected to increase from 78 mb/d 
in 2002 to 115-118 mb/d in 2025/2030 (a 50 percent growth). Crude oil - accounting for 37 
percent of the world's energy mix - will remain the world's most important global energy 
source, thanks to the expansion of the transport sector (whose share of total oil consumption 
will rise from 47 to about 55 percent).  
• Since 2000, China alone has accounted for 40 percent of the world's crude oil demand. 
China has already replaced the United States as the centre of the world's raw material's mar-
ket and as a price setter for these industrial raw materials. In 2003, China already displaced 
Japan as the world's second largest energy consumer and oil importer after the United States, 
and surpassed Tokyo as the third largest exporter (after the U.S. and Germany).  
                                                
1 This analysis is based on numerous publications of the author on the EUs, Russian and Chinese/Asian energy security as 
well as their implications for their foreign and security policies, including F. Umbach, “Globale Energiesicherheit. 
Strategische Herausforderung für die europäische und deutsche Außenpolitik“ ((“Global Energy Security: Strategic 
Challenges for the European and German Foreign and Security Policies”), (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 2003), 328 
pp. (in German) and idem, „Global Energy Supply und Geopolitical Challenges“, in: Francois Godement/Francoise 
Nicolas/Taizo Yakusiji (Eds.), Asia and Europe—Cooperating for Energy Security, A CAEC Task Force Report, Pa-
ris 2004, pp. 137-168 and idem, “Europe’s Energy Non-Policy“, Transatlantic Internationale Politik 4/2004, pp. 52-
60. 
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• The economic rise of Asia (above all China and India) has not only created an enormous re-
gional energy demand, it also has raised countless foreign and security policy questions for 
both regional and global stability.  
• With China's growing hunger for energy resources and industrial raw materials has come a 
much more pro-active foreign and security policy, both regionally and globaly. Beijing's im-
port dependencies (energy and raw materials) have numerous consequences for its foreign, 
security and defense policies.  Present policies show this in regard to Iran's ambivalent nu-
clear program; China's effort to keep this issue out of the UN Security Council is an exam-
ple. 
•  The recent Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict has also put Russia's reputation as a reliable en-
ergy supplier and partner for the EU into question. That raises important issues regarding 
Europe's future energy supply se-
curity in general and its energy 
partnership with Russia in particu-
lar.  
The following analysis will give an over-
view of the energy and security challenges 
related to the role of China and Russia in global energy stability, including the implications of their 
foreign and security policies for the EU and transatlantic relations. It will begin with an analysis of 
the EU's growing energy security challenges. 
The EU's Energy Security Dilemma 
eficiencies in global energy systems, failing governments in oil and gas producing countries, 
indeed, crises of any kind in countries and regions outside of Europe—all these things will 
increasingly affect Europe's politico-economic stability as the global market for energy 
tightens. Although renewable energies and new technologies (such as the fuel cell) are becoming 
more important and energy efficiency will be increased, they will be unable to contribute much to 
the global energy supply until 2025/2030.  
The present crisis of rising demand for energy in emerging economies like China and India comes 
with the doubling of oil prices since 2003—and mounting uncertainties about threats of terrorism, 
how long oil and gas reserves will last, and what kind of capacity is really going to be available on 
the global market. In this respect, the present global energy and supply crisis is very different from 
past ones. Thus far, however, the 25 EU member states have failed to forge a coherent European 
energy security strategy that envisages a clear response to the growing risks of oil and gas depend-
ency over time.  
Table 1: World Primary Energy Demand 1971-2030 
 1971 2003 2010 2020 2030 2003-2030* 
Coal 1439 2582 2860 3301 3724 1.4 percent 
Oil 2446 3785 4431 5036 5546 1.4 percent 
Gas 895 2244 2660 3338 3942 2.1 percent 
Nuclear 29 687 779 778 767 0.4 percent 
Hydro 104 227 278 323 368 1.8 percent 
Biomass and waste 683 1143 1273 1454 1653 1.4 percent 
Other renewables 4 54 107 172 272 6.2 percent 
Total 5600 10723 12389 14402 16271 1.6 percent 
*Average annual growth rate. 
Source: IEA, 'World Energy Outlook 2005', Paris 2005, here p. 82. 
D 
Deficiencies in global energy systems, failing 
governments in oil and gas producing coun-
tries, indeed, crises of any kind in countries and 
regions outside of Europe—all these things will 
increasingly affect Europe’s politico-economic 
stability as the global market for energy tight-
ens. 
China and Russia: Implications for European and Transatlantic Security Cooperation 
 23
Over the past decade or two, the energy policies of the EU and its member states have been increas-
ingly determined by market forces and a separation of energy questions from political factors and 
strategic developments. Ultimately, energy policies have been left to the industry. Their business 
interests, however, are primarily guided by short-term economic benefits in an increasingly competi-
tive environment. At the same time, a mid-and long-term national interest in energy supply security 
has been neglected by both energy com-
panies and national governments. In 
addition, the privatization of the gas 
sector, in which new companies emerge, 
means there will be no single party that 
will assume overall responsibility for the 
security of gas supply. Therefore, the organization of security for oil and gas supplies can no longer 
be entrusted solely to the industry at a time when other regions and new/old players like China and 
India are already pursuing aggressive national strategies determined by geopolitical considerations 
(including Russia and many OPEC countries) rather than relying on the “invisibile hand” of market 
forces. Whereas this separation of economics from politics has made sense for the internal EU mar-
ket due to the existing common norms and understandings of the overall importance of market 
forces, energy policies determined outside of Europe are more than ever defined by those strategic 
and geopolitical interests of national foreign and security policies (particularly in Russia, China, 
OPEC-countries, and others).  
In contrast to many EU member states (such as Germany), the EU-Commissioner for Transport and 
Energy and foreign and security experts of the EU have intensified their analysis of the EU's future 
energy and supply security. “Energy security” finds mention in the EU's first global “European Se-
curity Strategy”—the most important document of its CFSP. In 2004 the British Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office published an international “Energy Strategy” with a specific foreign policy view, 
while the foreign ministry of the Netherlands completed a similar internal policy document last 
summer. These new documents also highlight the differences between the various national energy 
policies and priorities of the EU member states, which makes any coherent international energy se-
curity strategy of the EU difficult to implement until it acquires a supranational authority to do so. 
Despite a constitutional draft that gave the EU more power and influence in the realm of energy 
policies, its, this remains a field where member states and the EU Commission have to share their 
competence and authority.  
Without an EU constitution in place, the national differences in energy policies and strategies in-
creasingly threaten political cohesion, thereby undermining the EU's evolving CFSP. Although the 
EU has established its own energy partnership with Russia, for instance, many new EU member 
states and even France and Great Britain have voiced criticisms or expressed their concerns about 
the ever-growing energy dependence of Germany on Russia—this may have unwanted implications 
for their own energy, foreign and security policies. The controversial discussions of a new underwa-
ter Baltic gas pipeline (North European Gas Pipeline - NEGP) from Russia to Germany and the in-
sufficient German consultation of Poland and the Baltic states, for instance, during the Schroeder-era 
have demonstrated again the unilateralist tendencies in European energy policies and the lack of a 
common and coherent EU energy security strategy. Those policies, however, are extremely short-
sighted because they also undermine the EU's CFSP and ignore the lesson that any individual EU 
member state is too weak to establish itself as a strategic actor in the context of a growing energy 
resource competition vis-à-vis China, Russia, India, Japan and the OPEC. In this light, the British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair had already demanded a common EU energy policy in October 2005, 
arguing in the European Parliament: 
„For far too long we have been in the situation where, in a haphazard and random way energy 
needs and energy priorities are simply determined in each country according to the needs, but 
without any sense of the collective power we could have in Europe if we were prepared to pool 
our energy and our resources.”  
Although energy questions dominated the negotiations leading up to the treaties of Paris (1951) and 
Rome (1957), the specific institutional provisions were made just for coal and nuclear industries 
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(leading to the EURATOM treaty in 1957). In regard to oil, gas and renewable energy sources, each 
EU member is free to determine their own national energy policies.  
EU members possess only about 0.6 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, 2.0 percent of the 
global gas reserves and, at least, 7.3 percent of proven coal reserves. In 2001, the EU produced 4.1 
percent of the world's crude oil, 9 percent of global natural gas, and 11 percent of the world's coal. 
With its eastward extension, the EU was able to increase its coal reserves substantially (by 41 per-
cent), but not its oil and gas reserves. In 2002, the EU accounted for 16  percent of world energy 
consumption with just 6 percent of the world's population. In 2001, oil was still the dominant fuel 
for 43 percent of total EU energy consumption, followed by gas at 23 percent. It imported 27.5 per-
cent of its oil demand from Eastern Europe (mainly Russia), 24.6 percent from the Middle East, 20.5 
percent from Africa and 19.95 percent from Norway.  
Table 2: EU - Primary Energy Demand 1971-2030 (Mtoe) 
 1971 2002 2010 2030 2003-2030* 
Coal 426 303 307 274 -0.4 percent 
Oil 633 648 687 743 0.5 percent 
Gas 93 389 468 649 1.8 percent 
Nuclear 13 251 251 146 -1.9 percent 
Hydro 20 26 30 33 0.8 percent 
Biomass and waste 25 65 84 147 3.0 percent 
Other renewables 2 8 21 57 7.2 percent 
Total 1211 1690 1848 2048 0.7 percent 
*Average annual rate of growth. 
Source: IEA, 'World Energy Outlook 2004', Paris 2004, Table 8.3, p. 251. 
Gas will make up most future new capacity, while the number of oil and solid-fuel power stations 
will continue to decline. With the EU's enlargement policies bringing in new East European coun-
tries, Europe's energy dependence will reach even more worrying proportions. Natural gas imports, 
for instance, may rise from 60 percent to 90 percent and oil from 90 percent to 94 percent. Thus the 
EU's long-term strategy for energy supply security has to assure uninterrupted physical availability 
of energy products on the market, at a price which is affordable for all private and industrial con-
sumers, while at the same time balancing environmental concerns - an even more important objec-
tive in the light of the Kyoto-protocol.  
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Table 3: EU - Fuel Shares in Primary Energy Demand 1971-2030  
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Source: IEA, 'World Energy Outlook 2004', Paris 2004, Figure 8.4, S. 252. 
Moreover, the expansion of natural gas as an environmentally clean energy source will also play a 
very important role in the next two decades for the EU member states. In this regard, the EU and 
Russia (with its 48 trillion cubic meters of reserves) declared an “energy partnership” in October 
2000. EU gas consumption is expected to increase from 370 billion cubic meter (bcm) up to 605-820 
bcm. Based on comparable calculations, the IEA, for instance, projected a greater increase of the 
EU's natural gas imports from 49 percent in 2002 to over 81 percent - compared with the European 
Commission (70 percent) - until 2020/2030. The share of gas in total primary demand will rise from 
23 percent at present to 32 percent in 2030. In the future, it is expected that a growing share of EU 
gas imports will be shipped as LNG.  
The enlarged European Union borders on the main oil and gas producing areas such as Russia, Cas-
pian Sea and North Africa, and with a decreasing distance also the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. 
Against this background, the EU has become more pro-active in order to widen and deepen its en-
ergy dialogues with neighboring countries and regions. With external dependence on imports fore-
cast to grow steadily, the EU has started to integrate energy aspects into its CFSP and relations with 
third countries. Despite being a major player on the international energy market, the EU has recog-
nized that it would remain a political dwarf on the global stage if the member states keep the upper 
hand on energy and foreign policies. Hence the European Commission is seeking to intensify rela-
tions with major producer and consumer countries, notably Russia and the countries of the Caspian 
Basin, the Mediterranean region, Norway, Ukraine and even beyond, in order to diversify the EU's 
future oil and gas supply networks. It has also expanded its energy discussions with the main con-
sumer countries, such as the U.S.A., China and Japan. However, until the early summer of 2005, the 
EU lacked an important institutionalized dialogue forum with the OPEC countries and particularly 
the Persian Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia. But in 2005, the first two meetings took place, and 
individual bilateral dialogues between the European Commission and the six members of the Golf 
Cooperation Council have started.  
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China's Energy Insecurity and the Implications for its Foreign and Security Policies 
he energy demand of the People's Republic of China as the world's most populous country 
will have a long-term influence on regional and global energy supplies as well as manifold 
effects upon Beijing's foreign and security policy, regional stability in Northeast, South and 
Central Asia and Beijing's relations with the United States and Europe. With its 1.3 billion inhabi-
tants, China is already the world's second-largest consumer of primary energy (accounting for more 
than 10 percent of the global primary energy demand), the third-largest energy producer and after 
the United States, the largest contributor to global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In 2003, China 
imported 91 million tons (mt) of crude oil—31 percent more than in 2002. At present, it depends on 
imports for almost 50 percent of its oil consumption; this may rise to 74 percent by 2030 (according 
to IEA forecasts).  
China is a key player in world energy markets and one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world,. China's anticipated annual economic growth of around 4.8 percent will drive up China's en-
ergy demand, though on a lower scale (around 2.7 percent). China's oil demand will rise by  40 per-
cent until 2030, due to vigorous growth in the transport sector. With a projected 3 percent annual 
increase in primary oil demand, China's oil consumption of 5 mb/d in 2001 may more than double 
by 2025 to 12.8 mb/d, with net imports of 9.4 mb/d. According to the IEA's projections, net oil im-
ports will rise from 1.7 mb/d in 2001 to 4.2 mb/d in 2010, around 8 mb/d and 10 mb/d in 2030—
almost equivalent of those of the United States in 2000, the present total crude oil production of 
Saudi Arabia as the largest oil producer in the world and more than the projected net imports of Ja-
pan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand combined.  
Energy experts are always worried about price increases, whether sudden or steady. At the same 
time, some forces will work to mitigate the price impact of the massive increase in oil consumption 
out of China and East Asia: increased global oil production, the increasing market orientation of 
national energy policy including privatization and deregulation, more efficient package-switched 
distribution of energy, conservation technologies and policies. Energy security is also dependent on 
non-market forces. It depends not least of all on the policies of the states concerned and the choice of 
national strategies for energy security. This is especially true of the Asia-Pacific region, where 60-70 
percent of all crude oil imports are still arranged by contracts with state-owned or semi-state con-
trolled international Asian companies. These contracts are determined not only by economic factors, 
but also by strategic aspects of the foreign and security policy of the individual country. Given the 
new energy policy dependencies in the early 1990s, Chinese foreign and security policy had to deal 
with regions and countries that until then had played either no or only a secondary role in its tradi-
tional foreign policy. For that reason, the possibility of greater economic and political rivalry, in 
particular with Japan, India, the United States and, in the medium and long-term, Russia (in Central 
Asia), for shrinking global oil reserves cannot be excluded.  
Since early 1997, China has shown a policy of demonstrative activity in securing of new sources of 
energy. In 1997 alone, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) completed no less than 
18 international petroleum and petrochemical projects with a contract value of around USD 750 
million. These included the purchase of foreign oil companies (or acquisition of major stakes in the 
companies), pipeline projects (in Turkmenistan and Thailand) and the construction of refineries and 
depots abroad. In addition, the PRC is also participating in the development of oil fields in Russia, 
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Egypt, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Iran and Sudan. By Octo-
ber 1997, China had already concluded 126 contracts and agreements with a value of US$5.38 bil-
lion, signed with 67 companies from 18 countries. In 2002, China controlled more than 2.72 billion 
barrels of oil reserves outside its own territory by means of take-overs and international alliances.  
Although China's government plans to launch a new round of exploration projects inside China to 
reduce the country's growing dependence on foreign energy resources, its main focus now is on 
gaining more overseas drilling rights for Chinese companies. These steps present new risks for 
China's future oil security. Nonetheless, Chinese companies have stepped up their investment abroad 
to acquire direct control or partial rights in some of the world's potential oil fields. Beijing has 
forged closer ties with almost all continents. It has become much more pro-active in Africa (Sudan, 
T 
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Chad, Angola), the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria) and even Latin America (Bolivia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Columbia, Peru and Brazil). Despite the fact that China has recently secured 
new supplies of oil and gas resources with Australia and Indonesia, the Persian Gulf region has be-
come steadily more important not only for the energy policies of China and the other Asian states, 
but also for their national foreign and security policies. At present Saudi Arabia accounts for some 
16 percent of China's oil imports, while Iran contributes 14-15 percent. In 2004, China signed a pre-
liminary $70 billion contract to buy Iranian oil and natural gas, whereas India at the beginning of 
2005 also completed a $40 billion gas deal to import 7.5mt of LNG annually over a 25-year period.  
The increasingly global orientation of Chinese foreign and security policy toward the Persian Gulf, 
Africa and even Latin America Since the mid-1990s stems from China's energy requirements and 
rapidly increasing imports of oil and gas from countries outside the Asia-Pacific region. All these 
Chinese diplomatic activities in the energy field have produced an economic-security nexus that is 
determined by the most fundamental core interest of Beijing's political leadership: economic growth 
and domestic stability in order to ensure regime survival. However, these unilateral energy-security 
strategies are undermining multilateral and regional co-operation and may fuel already existing stra-
tegic rivalries such as with Japan, India and the United States. Nonetheless, Europe has so far failed 
to heed and analyse these economic and political interdependencies and their geo-political implica-
tions for China's foreign and security policies, although they raise numerous challenges not only for 
the United States, but also for the European Union. 
As Chinese energy and foreign policy experts have admitted, China had always played a rather pas-
sive diplomatic role in the Middle East, declaring obvious platitudes about seeking peace and stabil-
ity, but in reality not really caring too much about regional stability. Now China has a lot at stake 
and pays much closer attention to the strategic developments in this region. This is all the truer be-
cause China's energy policies and "oil diplomacy" continue to give bilateral relations clear priority 
over multi-lateral strategies and solutions designed to safeguard its energy supply. However, at the 
start of the 21st Century, these are utterly inadequate to deal with the countless challenges that the 
process of globalization has created for international trade, regional conflict management or interna-
tional efforts in the field of arms control policy and non-proliferation measures for weapons of mass 
destruction. Both the Middle East and Central Asia are confronted with countless internal and re-
gional instabilities that could have a strong negative impact on the reliability of regional and global 
energy supplies. Moreover, China could find itself exposed to growing political pressure from the 
oil- and gas-exporting states in the Middle East. This political pressure could result in either greater 
Chinese arms exports, including sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, or to concessions by 
Beijing on other political issues that run counter to Western and EU policies and long-term strategic 
interests such as in the case of the Iran. Chinese support for the Russian and French positions on UN 
sanctions and objections to military action against Iraq, Western policy toward Iran and problematic 
arms exports to Teheran and other Gulf states (including ballistic missiles) in the 1990s have already 
demonstrated this problem.  
Russia—A Reliable Energy Partner for the EU and the West? 
ussia seems to be the logical energy partner for the EU: It enjoys the world's largest natural 
gas reserves, the second largest coal reserves, the eighth largest oil reserves; it is already the 
world's largest exporter of natural gas, the second largest oil exporter (only behind Saudi 
Arabia) and the third largest energy consumer. Given the political instabilities in the Middle East, 
the natural solution for Germany and the rest of the EU seems to be to expand imports of oil and 
natural gas from Russia, as expressed in the European-Russian energy partnership proclaimed in 
2000. At first glance, there are indeed a number of reasons (not least the argument of improved po-
litical stability) for a drastic escalation of energy imports from Russia, being the EU's fifth largest 
trading partner (after the United States, Switzerland, China and Japan). In 1999, 45 percent of Rus-
sia's total energy exports, 53 percent of its oil exports and 56 percent of its natural gas exports to 
Europe were delivered to the EU, reflecting mutual economic interdependencies. At present, Gaz-
prom alone supplies 25 percent of the EU's natural gas needs, and the EU buys 85 percent of Rus-
sia's oil exports. For modernizing and expanding its energy sector, Russia needs more than $900 
R 
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billion by the year 2020. In this respect, the EU appears as the perfect modernization partner of Rus-
sia. On May 22, 2003 the Russian government released its official 'Energy Strategy to 2003-2020', 
which outlines key objectives, interests and strategies of its energy policies. But it also raises new 
questions in regard to the future volumes of Russia's oil and gas exports to the EU.  
Although Russia has fulfilled its supply obligations under its long-term contracts with the EU since 
the beginning of the 1980s, Moscow's pipeline plans and policies are not just determined by eco-
nomic considerations but also by the geopolitical interests of its foreign and security policies. The 
EU is interested in increasing the future import of Russian oil and gas (rising oil and gas demand 
until 2020) and thus has often ignored geopolitical dimension of Russia's energy and pipeline poli-
cies. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether Russia can deliver the needed amounts of oil and 
gas and whether the EU will not increasingly diversify its oil and gas imports—particularly after the 
recent Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict and the Yukos-affair. The arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
chief executive of the private Russian oil giant Yukos, has caused uncertainty regarding the future of 
reform policies in the Russian energy sector. As the result of the Kremlin's crackdown on Yukos and 
its policies to increase state control of the energy sector, a sharp decline of Western investment in 
this sector  occurred  in 2005. Moreover, the Yukos-case is not unique, but part of an overall re-
nationalization concept in Russia's energy industry. However, adding lucrative oil production facili-
ties to Gazprom in an effort to transfer it to one of the world's biggest energy companies, restoring 
state control (51 percent of the shares of Gazprom), and going to global markets to raise billions in 
new capital will not likely encourage energy efficiency, combat widespread corruption, promote 
internal reforms and increase much needed transparency. Consequently, in view of Russia's need for 
vast direct foreign investment of more than $900 billion, it is highly doubtful whether that country in 
the next two decades can modernize its own utility industry enough to keep pace with the energy 
exports that Moscow is planning to make to Europe. Sixty percent of Russia's gas pipelines, for in-
stance, are older than 20 years, which is nearly two-thirds of their projected lifespan. Pipeline capac-
ity is already limited. 
Moreover, from the outset of Putin's presidency, international experts have observed a “creeping re-
nationalization” of Russia's energy policy, albeit Putin has pragmatically welcomed an increase in 
the financial involvement of Western companies, especially German ones. The controversial deci-
sion by Germany's former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to accept an appointment with the North 
European Gas Pipeline Company (NEGPC), a project controlled by Gazprom and, therewith, the 
Kremlin, has highlighted the often naïve views in German political and economic circles on Russia's 
energy and pipeline policies.  
In 1997, before Putin was appointed Prime Minister and then elected President, he defended a Can-
didate of Sciences dissertation (“Mining Raw Materials in the Strategy for Development of the Rus-
sian Economy”) at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute, in which he outlined his views on natural 
resource policy for Russia. His thesis and his article of 1999 in the institute's journal summarizing 
his dissertation thesis are fully consistent with his re-nationalization policies of Russia's natural re-
sources sector during the last years. Putin—who sees the demise of the Soviet Union as “the greatest 
catastrophe of the 20th Century”—views Russia's resource sector and particularly its energy industry 
as a strong supporter of a “managed democracy” from above. It is to serve not only as key to the 
nation's economic development, but also Russia's geo-political revival as a new economic-political 
(energy) superpower—at a time when 66 percent of Russians regret the collapse of the USSR. In his 
ambitions to use Russia's oil, gas and pipeline industry as the most important instrument of Russian 
foreign and security policy, the Russian state must exert strategic control over the energy sector; it 
cannot be left entirely to market forces and strategies. Hence, Putin allowed not only the dismantling 
of Yukos through a series of legally dubious machinations, he increased the government stake in 
Gazprom from 38 to 51 percent. He also allowed it to buy Sibneft as Russia's fifth-largest oil com-
pany. By having majority control of Gazprom, the state directly controls now 30 percent of Russian 
oil output. The new “Kreml Inc.”, a circle of few confidants of Putin, already controls nine big com-
bines and, therewith, not less than 40 percent of the Russian GDP at the end of 2004. In Putin's view 
- supported by many “silowiki” in the Kremlin, ministries and the parliament - the EU's increasing 
dependence on Russia's gas imports and pipelines and European oil and gas sectors owned by Rus-
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sian companies may lead to a policy of “silence for gas.” This would be an “oil and gas-fueled 
Finlandization of Europe.” According to Russian analysts, the wide acquisition of Gazprom stock by 
the Moscow elite during the last years means that many of the same people who are designing Rus-
sia's foreign policy are also the large Gazprom stockholders.  
In August 2005, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov, stated that Russia was planning a radical 
change in its policy vis-à-vis other former Soviet republics and even influential powers such as the 
United States and the EU. Moscow would no longer tolerate any agreements in which it did not re-
ceive economic or political benefits for its oil and gas exports. This demonstrated a new political 
willingness by the Kremlin to reward the politically loyal (like Belarus or Armenia) by allowing 
them to enjoy huge subsidies valued in the billions of dollar a year, and to pressure and intimidate 
the intransigent countries of the former Soviet Union (such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and oth-
ers), that is, those turning away from Moscow on key foreign policy issues. 
The recent energy conflict between Moscow and Kiev (Ukraine imports a third of its energy from 
Russia) has shown that the Russian government and President Vladimir Putin are prepared not only 
to use Russian energy to force customers to pay much higher prices almost over night, but also to 
use it as a foreign policy tool to pressure customers to concede to Moscow's geopolitical ambitions. 
Shortly before the outbreak of the conflict, Gazprom—controlling 16 percent of the world's known 
natural gas reserves and carrying 25 percent of the EU's gas supplies as well as 80 percent of Rus-
sia's gas exports, transported via pipelines over the Ukrainian territory - took steps in order to ensure 
its leverage by blocking all other regional producers from providing Ukraine with alternative sources 
by buying up all of their production itself, such as those of Turkmenistan. The intended gas conflict 
was also a new attempt by Putin to influence the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine 
next March.  
Moscow was not so much interested in world market prices, but rather to acquire the Ukrainian pipe-
line system—especially after Moscow took over the ownership of the Yamal-gas pipeline on the 
territory of Belarus in December 2005. Gazprom has already tried to buy into the gas-distribution 
networks in Hungary and Poland to regenerate itself as a great power in Europe and beyond. It has 
also put immense pressure on the Georgian government to cede control over the gas pipelines that 
ship gas from Russia to Georgia and beyond to Armenia. Thus both Georgia and Ukraine have op-
posed any Russian ambitions to take over their pipeline system, which would have consequences for 
their pro-Western foreign and security policies.  
With the Kremlin plan to create a Gas-OPEC from Europe to Asia and the conclusion of different 
bilateral and individual deals with European companies rather than partnerships, Moscow has also 
encouraged fierce competition among European companies and states for access to Russian energy 
assets. For years, Russia has locked European gas companies into long-term contracts, making them 
critically dependent on Gazprom for many years. This is part of an overall energy and foreign policy 
doctrine to increase Gazprom's market share in Western Europe (with the focus on Germany) from 
26 to 38 percent by 2020. The long-term contracts go far beyond just gas deliveries. By using its 
monopoly status and political power to dictate the prices, often regardless of previously agreed con-
tracts, Gazprom efforts are directed at controlling the exploration, delivery and sale of gas to many 
countries in order to lock up these markets, such that these countries cannot turn elsewhere for their 
energy.  
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that progress on the mutual energy dialogue has been 
hampered by the two parties´ divergent interpretations of its meaning. While Russia wants EU sup-
port to modernize its energy sector and protect its strategic and geopolitical position in Europe 
through the European Union, the EU has sought the reform and opening of the Russian energy mar-
ket through market mechanisms and the creation of a positive business climate. 
Given their own experiences as weak states vis-à-vis the “big brother,” it is hardly surprising that 
Poland and the Baltic states have heavily criticized the new German-Russian agreement to build a 
1,200 km gas pipeline directly linking them under the Baltic Sea by 2010. Indeed, the German gov-
ernment of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder did not consult its new EU neighbor states nor did it re-
view and take into account the underlying geopolitical motivations of the Kremlin or the energy, 
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ecological and security interests of these new EU members. Given the re-nationalization trends in 
the so-called “strategic sectors” of the Russian economy and particularly in its energy industry, there 
is no guarantee that Western and even German companies will not find themselves in an analogous 
position to Yukos. Furthermore, the economic rational behind the project is very questionable, be-
cause the costs of this underwater pipeline are 2 to 3 times that of a comparable land pipeline - even 
if one includes higher transit costs through several countries. Furthermore, there are more economi-
cally attractive pipeline options from Central Asia, which would offer a real diversification of pipe-
lines and supply sources and routes, and thus enhance the EU's future energy security. 
Conclusions and Perspectives  
he EU faces new energy challenges in the coming decades for which it must have an appro-
priate energy security strategy. Due to the environmental obligations of the Kyoto-Protocol, 
phasing-out nuclear energy programs in important EU member states, and increasing deple-
tion of oil and gas fields in the Northern Sea until 2020, the EU will become much more dependent 
on oil and gas imports from outside Europe. In addition to Russia, this includes unstable countries 
and regions in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. Despite new energy-saving measures and 
the promotion of renewable energy sources, oil and gas will remain the primary energy sources 
through 2025. Therefore, and given the completion of the internal market, the EU and its member 
states need to take a global view in an age of globalization and growing interdependencies between 
domestic, external and economic security on one hand, and local, regional and global political as 
well as socio-economic stability on the other hand. Accordingly, the EU needs to introduce a real 
global strategy of security of energy supply that is based on a new balance between market and stra-
tegic approaches—thereby giving more weight to highly important geopolitical risks, both in a 
Common European Energy Policy (CEEP) as well as in the CFSP. The EU needs new policy in-
struments for a CEEP and its CFSP to assure the global security of energy supplies.  
The Western aim of encouraging China's integration into the international global cooperation struc-
tures, while insisting, in return, that Beijing abide the same rules as everyone else, will remain the 
major strategic goal and challenge for the years to come. China's energy policies and the implica-
tions for its foreign and security policies will create a particular challenge for transatlantic security 
cooperation. On the EU side, a more critical discussion of the global efforts of de-nuclearizing Iran 
in the framework of China's energy and 
resource diplomacy, for instance, is overdue. 
Another example is China's and India's at-
tempts to engage “states of concern” (such 
as Myanmar, Sudan, and Zimbabwe) in or-
der to access their energy resources. Chinese 
and Indian policies are undermining attempts by the United States and the European Union to isolate 
these regimes economically and politically. This highlights one of the major challenges and dilem-
mas of the EU's policies vis-à-vis China in the next decade: To protect long-term EU and Western 
security interests without driving China into political linkages with pariah states. 
Regardless of the volume of the future Russian energy imports (which also needs to be discussed), 
the EU-25 will need to diversify its rising oil and gas imports by also looking to other potential en-
ergy producers—even those which are seen as politically more unstable. Given their close proximity 
to an expanded EU-30,  rising oil and gas energy imports, the global fight against international ter-
rorism,  and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the EU is forced to deepen and expand its 
relations to Central Asian states and countries in the Middle East by pursuing “strategic partner-
ships” and “strategic dialogues.” Russia and the Caspian Sea states have the potential to break into 
some markets in Europe, the United States and Asia, but they cannot replace the Middle East as the 
world's primary supplier of oil. 
In regard to Germany's and the EU's energy partnership with Russia, a more objective, realistic, 
comprehensive and analytical view of Russia's energy policies is urgently needed - the Merkel coali-
tion government has begun to move in this direction. The EU can no longer overlook Russian use 
energy resources and pipeline monopolies in  the 1990s as a foreign policy instrument towards its 
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neighbors on the territory of the former USSR and particularly Ukraine. Ukraine is the target of Rus-
sia's ambitions to become a new great power based on its energy resources and attendant political 
influence on the regional and global level. In Putin's view, Russia's energy sector becomes the new 
Russian source of international power and prestige and part of the global balance of forces. Energy 
has replaced Russia's once great military power, which is only a shadow of its former myth. Hence 
the Russian state must play the dominant role in its strategic industries, particularly in its oil and gas 
sectors. In this context, Gazprom has become the national energy champion and the most important 
foreign policy instrument. Putin's new energy security doctrine is not only an energy challenge, but 
also a foreign policy challenge, for transatlantic relations and the EU in particular. 
The Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict has called Moscow's reputation into question as a reliable energy 
partner of Germany and the EU. It was also a clear breach of the spirit if not the letter of the World 
Trade Organization, which Russia is likely to join in coming months. If Russia follows the present 
path, it will be part of the problem of global energy insecurity, not part of the solution. 
As Russia is hosting the 2006 G-8 Summit, where it wants to discuss Russia's increasing role in 
global energy security, Moscow faces clear constraints. Russia can not argue persuasively that it 
wants to play such a role and at the same time to use energy supplies as a foreign policy instrument 
to pressure Ukraine (meanwhile also Moldova and Bulgaria). Russia can not demonstrate its political 
desire to have the capacity to inflict real economic pain and political pressure, even towards the EU 
and the West. 
Therefore, the EU needs a constructive discussion about the extent to which it should become de-
pendent on just one energy producer —in the case of Russia, a producer that is not a democracy 
(though it is more stable than many countries in the Middle East or Central Asia) and is still leverag-
ing energy access, particularly pipeline plans, for its foreign and security policies. These often run 
contrary to those of its neighbors as well as of many long-term strategic interests of the EU. The re-
nationalization trends are an important prerequisite for Putin's increasingly assertive foreign policies, 
using its energy policies, exports and pipeline plans as an instrument of political pressure and 
blackmail in Eurasia. 
Therefore, the EU needs to minimize dependency on just one single energy producer, even 
if a certain energy dependence on Russia is unavoidable. There is really no alternative to an 
EU-Russia energy partnership. It must also  manage its policy better by taking into account 
the interests not just of its new members (such as Poland) but also of those left outside (i.e., 
Ukraine and Central Asian states) in order to develop lasting regional stability.  The recent 
Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict has underlined these basic principles:  First, importance of a 
collective EU energy security policy vis-à-vis Russia that moves away from coercion on 
individual countries to real collaboration and cooperation on an equal status between a 
politically united EU and a more pragmatic, democratic and market-oriented Russia. 
Second, the obvious though difficult need to diversify energy supply sources and energy 
transportation routes.  
